To discover sustainable hegemony in an increasingly multipolar world, American policy makers will need more than the Kaysen list of advantages from basic science. Dr. Carl Kaysen served President John Kennedy as deputy national security adviser and over his long career held distinguished professorships in Political Economy at Harvard and MIT. During the 1960s, Kaysen laid out a framework with four important reasons why a great power, the United States in particular, should take a strategic interest in the basic sciences.
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These arguments underscored science's contribution to new products and services that provided market or military advantages. The pursuit of physics, chemistry, and biology at the frontiers of knowledge could have direct effects on national excellence.
The following sections of this article extend Kaysen's list for the present multi-polar world. The
United States' largest military and economic shares in such a world do not guarantee empire. Soft power from scientific achievement, however, may make up part of the deficit, enough to augment America's reputation and American leadership in the international order. The U.S. science establishment is then described and evaluated for its capacity to integrate and leverage the complete list of science benefits:
Kaysen's nation-based items plus the civilization-based advantages exposited here.
Case studies of the Office of Naval Research and U.S. scientific outreach to Brazil illustrate underlying strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. system for maintaining the lead in basic science. Among the weaknesses, democratic regimes tend to suffocate professions, particularly in the sciences, due to natural hostility between democracy and technocracy. The United States might yet find the right balance by inculcating a politically sophisticated professionalism. In other areas of heavy government responsibility-finance, health care, foreign intelligence, and defense-officials and the public have over time placed considerable trust in expert agents. With greater scientific literacy at the mass level and greater political literacy at the scientific level, America's state and society may forge a somewhat freer, healthier relationship with American science, accruing benefits for U.S. material power in the long run and, in the short run, for persuasive influence in the international system.
Science and International Leadership

In their book on Leading Sectors and World Powers (1996), George Modelski and William
Thompson extended their analysis of innovation back, beyond the birth of industrial capitalism, to the Sung Dynasty in China at the turn of the First Millennium. 2 Modelski and Thompson mentioned inventions like the compass that helped leaders extract wealth from maritime East-West trade routes, but they also noted the Sung rulers' cultivation of knowledge and the influence of Chinese intellectuals on administrative reform.
A scientific society has the opportunity to apply methods and models toward political and economic questions. Just before the November 2008 elections, the New York Times' David Ignatius sat down with two former national security advisers, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, for a series of interviews on foreign policy. 3 In their discussion of complementary strengths that could lay the groundwork for greater transatlantic cooperation, the advisers noted how impressive it was that the European Union could knit together so many independent states with sophisticated, comprehensive rules and regulations without inadvertently strangling economic growth. It seems improbable that Europe could build the administrative structures for a successful common currency or a single labor market without an ethos that came from scientific competence. Progress in the physical sciences can spill over in a way that supports modern institutions and efficient public policy.
Spillover to social sciences reinforces the notion that scientific progress and scientific literacy are civilizing influences. As such they can fortify what Joseph Nye termed a country's soft power, its capacity to establish appealing precedents for the rest of the world. 4 Science shares properties with Olympic sport in that it can open avenues for non-coercive cultural hegemony. Foreign emulation in science, though, counts for more than soccer or gymnastics. The demonstration effect in physics may initially appear as man-overcoming-Nature rather than man-versusman, but great scientific advance is more cumulative than victory in the Games. Anyone seeking to take the next step must accommodate the vernacular of the pioneer and accept his tutelage in the universal logic governing scientific concepts. Moreover, the ingenuity and skills on display as a citizen in a specific nation-state, albeit working at university, unlocks another secret of nature register around the world as excellence that could someday be harnessed by government and adapted to the state-versus-state context.
That fungibility garners international respect and piques interest in greater collaboration. In his study of American science overtures to Europe during the first decades of the Cold War, John Krige related how overlapping interests and in some instances the overlapping community of scientists and government officials infused pure science aid with foreign policy purpose. The construction of CERN (Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire) for all-European particle research in Geneva. European conferences of the well-connected Ford Foundation and the development of the NATO Science
Committee did not simply advance basic knowledge; they also nurtured a special dialogue, unencumbered by normal diplomatic preoccupations. This privileged communication nevertheless facilitated American hegemony and buttressed Western solidarity against intimidation, or alternate offers, from the Soviet Union.
In material balance of power terms, the larger economy and more capable nuclear forces of the United States were seen as less threatening to Western Europe than the Red Army, deployed just over the makeshift border with East Germany. 5 Cultural appeal, including scientific prowess as well as liberal democratic ideals, afforded the United States extra diplomatic margin as it simultaneously expanded its own arsenal and its alliances against a technically inferior opponent.
Finally, during the late-Cold War, after 1970, the economic rise of Germany and Japan, the larger diplomatic role of China, and the greater international participation from post-colonial governments in the developing world reshaped the global agenda. Problems traditionally managed by the great powers-arms control, arms proliferation, international development, environmental consequences of industrialization and urbanization-were picked up by non-governmental entities who sought to influence state behavior. Given their small budgets and their status as outside observers rather than diplomats or official negotiators, specialized knowledge was their instrument of choice. As transportation and communication technologies improved through the 1980s and 1990s, issue-based groups and public policy institutes proliferated, combining with academic researchers to build epistemic communities.
Expert networks formed around the nuclear strategy of the superpowers, the international treaty for the Law of the Sea, the banning of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and landmines, and eradication of AIDS/HIV. By plugging into the growing list of intergovernmental organizations at the regional and global level, such communities not only supplied new facts to states. Their outside voices acquired editorial and political functions, directing states' limited attention to important issues and highlighting bargains as the basis for new international agreements. 6 Not surprisingly, many of the political challenges where epistemic communities have won access others. Yet, once a country has this lead, it commands a certain respect in the global commons and in international negotiations. It may not always get its way, but the scientific leader's interests must be taken into account, if for no other reason than the best information-however professionally delivered-is most often being filtered through a British, French, Chinese, or American mind. Even when science does not beget a marketable product or an advanced weapon system for the would-be hegemon, it can serve the national interest, providing subtle endorsement for the lead state through composition of epistemic communities, where the best minds gather to resolve international policy disputes.
In summary, basic science is more than an elixir for economic growth and superior military technology. 8 When a national establishment underwrites unparalleled progress in this essentially cosmopolitan endeavor, it has spillover effects: in the way a state debates domestically and improves upon its organization and policy performance; in whether other countries admire a lead state's culture;
and in steering international bargaining via talented scientists who keep their national identity as they migrate to increasingly influential epistemic communities.
The U.S. Science Establishment
In order to capitalize on a scientific lead, the most obvious strategy for sustaining hegemony would maximize the information flowing between basic research labs and the parties responsible for each of the mechanisms discussed, above. These mechanisms, or factors, in a state's appropriation of science broke down into two categories: the Kaysen list, which emphasized direct pathways to products and operations that overwhelmed economic or military competition, and the spillover list, which conveyed benefits to the hegemon through the broad appeal and accommodatingly neutral, man-versus-nature visage of scientific discovery.
Science policy becomes more complicated as initial assumptions shift from a unitary rational actor for the state to a complex bureaucracy embedded in a culture of democratic accountability. First, distinct agencies within the federal government cannot escape the outer limits of the federal budget: a dollar appropriated for the National Science Foundation, for example, has to come from new taxes, new debt, or another government agency. Just within the Kaysen list of objectives, the state cannot avoid trade-offs between support for defense and commercially relevant research, which in general falls under the responsibility of separate executive branch entities working with different classification rules, oversight committees, and sponsors in Congress.
More important than setting budget priorities, the missions of different organizations within the government have to be reconciled. A recent trend in foreign policy consulting urged a proper marriage between the technique of soft power and the coercive instruments of hard power. 9 The central flaw of Bush administration foreign policy after 9/11 was, in their view, unfortunate matchmaking. Neoconservatives combined ambitious democratization with willingness to press a conventional military advantage. The result was near universal resistance to the U.S. agenda, severe enough to curtail America's international influence. Something approximating hegemony, if not unipolarity, could be sustained if instead the United States threw its military and economic weight behind modest diplomatic ventures to consult and persuade the international community. In simple terms, hard power plus soft power would equal smart power, a kind of currency that could be well invested, not just consumed in terrifying, often violent rampages through global trouble areas.
Basic Science and Great Power Democracy
Science and technology policy may defy this reasonable sounding formula. The list of spillover processes in which scientific success breeds international success muddies the distinction between means 6 and ends. 10 German sociologist Max Weber famously warned that a clear separation between scientific facts and political values was necessary for the well-being of both science as an enterprise and the state.
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His reasoning anticipated Samuel Huntington's analysis of how to harness military expertise under the prerogatives of a liberal democratic state. 12 Grant the professional officers-or in another application of the logic, professional scientists-autonomy to advance in their field but require from them in return prudent comportment in the public sphere.
The dangerous alternative was a politicized professional class, claiming jurisdiction over questions of value and setting policy priorities based on the specious qualification of technical education.
Unless they stood down, placing their mastery of science aside when it came to defining the national interest, they distorted civic discourse. Each political faction would grasp for its own scientists to defend its public position from rivals who also claimed the mantle of universal and objective truth, with the end result that the state would deny itself the genuine fruits of science.
The rise and fall of civilizations, particularly the interaction of Chinese, Western, and Islamic polities over two millennia, gives some credence to Weber's concern. If a head of government justifies social and religious order on the basis of what scientific theory dictates, both the sciences and the sovereign are primed for disaster. Yet, troubling cases appear at the other extreme of complete separation.
The silence of scientists who permitted National Socialism to determine ultimate applications of their discoveries served neither biology nor Germany in the long run. Fastidious distinction of science and politics during the Vietnam War left university laboratories vulnerable to charges of casually arming American imperialism and abetting criminal destruction in Southeast Asia, in flagrant violation of higher education's own humanist charters. 13 Almost as quickly as one can call for a safe delineation of roles and missions, opponents ask whether scientists should hitch themselves to the wagon of state, regardless of the driver.
A compromise position, and a useful standard for measuring the appropriateness of the United
States science establishment, suggests that scientists should not work for any government that would run the enterprise into the ground. The very practice of science has prerequisites with political implications:
individual freedom to question conventional wisdom on the laws of nature regardless of endorsing authority, communal respect to permit the sharing of data and objective replication of experimental results, and cosmic humility to accept the contingent and limited reign of scientific theory.
This primordial soil for the growth of science would seem most conducive to the simultaneous development of constitutional democracy. 14 By comparison, authoritarian rule, in communist Russia or capitalist China, imposes a nonscientific political elite, which is predisposed to contain and eventually suffocate scientific freedom. 15 Pure democracy without the regulating mechanism of a constitution is vulnerable to capture by a wealthy or a populist faction with similarly devastating results for the small scientific minority within a society. 16 Despite the centrally planned economy and the risk of imprisonment or worse for crossing the likes of Stalin, Russian science posted impressive achievements in both theoretical and empirical fields during the Cold War. 17 Fear for one's physical safety, genuine nationalist determination not to remain prostrate before the American juggernaut, and lack of alternatives for personal satisfaction apparently counteracted the handicaps inflicted by centralized authority.
Further dispelling the notion of a tidy relation between political-economic arrangements and scientific success, German material science and chemistry advanced dramatically in the late-nineteenth century, powering its industrial output-in quantity and quality-past that of Great Britain, a more liberal and more democratic rival. 18 Compatibility between pluralist politics, free enterprise, and scientific freedom notwithstanding, market democracies are still vulnerable to losing the scientific lead. Just because researchers enjoy benefits from their status as a professional class in a free society does not mean they proceed as they wish. In democratic regimes, the ultimate guarantor for professional autonomy is the will of the people. Political representatives and executive branch officials may direct public money toward new research, but such funding streams cannot survive without general confidence from taxpayers that the system is working.
True, private companies in the United States have a proud history of funding basic research. Bell
Laboratories was famous for producing Nobel Laureates as well as technology breakthroughs. However, as competition intensified-particularly from foreign producers-industry tended to emphasize technology development over basic research. 19 From a business standpoint, basic research posed high risks and offered only heavily discounted rewards, due to the uncertainty of usable results, the length of time to convert basic findings into a marketable product, and the difficulty of patenting rather than publishing scientific findings. In a free enterprise economy, private sector scientists might not chafe under the dictates of central planners, but they still tailored investigations to meet the demands of quarterly earnings reports.
As industry shifted its resources from path breaking science, universities and government institutions had to pick up the slack, but they, of course, feel public pressure to make science pay, and both are expanding vehicles for public-private and academic-industry partnerships. It is still the case that despite China's faster rate of growth since 1990, at over $300 billion in 2004, U.S. research and development expenditure dominated the field, exceeding the EU-25 combined total and tripling the estimated investment for China. 20 Nevertheless, a better approach to evaluating whether the U.S. science establishment can help sustain America's preeminence in the twenty-first century would describe various government agencies' ability to resist popular and market-based encroachments upon funding for longterm, fundamental research.
Individualistic, creative approaches to verifying new behavior and advancing theoretical understanding of Nature are most likely to produce new knowledge that would drive future lead sectors in the global economy or the next technological revolution in military affairs. Another country, a so-called second mover, might still best the United States in converting a new discovery to improvements for manufacturing, but this incremental process fills out the thin, highly specialized treetops of scientific growth, and its economic value is sooner or later subject to the planting of another species-another profound discovery that completely revises engineering problems.
The basic science lead, for reasons the Kaysen framework specified, provides a nation-state unique flexibility to detect early and ride waves of technological change. Moreover, because of the nondemocratic and nonmarket aspects of science, its predilection to consort with idiosyncratic genius rather than the common pitchman, natural philosophy commands a universal, high culture appeal, which powers positive spillover effects for the state: better rationalization of public policies; international acclaim for the host civilization that spawns scientific achievement; and pride of place in transnational expert communities. A key question, then, asks whether the U.S. science establishment is poised to recognize and nurture good ideas in fundamental science.
Scattering among Mission Agencies
The first impression emerging from a survey of official support for basic science in the United
States is that of a ramshackle mansion set upon the richest topsoil. Grounds of this estate represent the nation's universities, which together comprise the largest performer of basic research. 21 Other entities include nonprofit research institutes, industry's research and development centers, and federal government labs.
Every year with the blessing of Congress and the president, servants come rushing out from tiny closets adjoining massive rooms scattered throughout the government establishment to plant seeds and offer a little water to the fecund earth. The seeds are powerful. They were purchased with the largest science and technology budgets in the world, but the servants are still in a precarious situation, for at each harvest they must report to their master how well the seed has grown. The masters run the day-to-day operations of the mansion, each assigned to manage one of the rooms, but collectively they have little reason to coordinate their moves unless it pleases the president-the mansion's chief executive-or the Congress, who owns the building. Each of the individual headquarters has its own function, important to the president's success, approved by Congress, and frustratingly remote for cultivating the garden outside.
Congress continues to buy some seeds, though. On rare occasions, the fruits of science in the outer garden beautify or even refurbish agencies inside the government house.
Three qualities that distinguish this U.S. science establishment are fragmentation (closets scattered throughout the government); deep reserves (massive adjoining rooms for each closet); and intense mission orientation within but not necessarily coordinated among the fragments. During the Cold War these qualities were considered strengths compared to the centralized, hierarchical state-science relationship in the Soviet Union. 22 Fragmentation across different executive departments prevented any one cabinet secretary from concentrating the federal budget for massive spending on a narrow slice of science. Normally, this was advantageous because of the great uncertainty involved in basic research. Since no authority could be certain whether a given experiment would succeed as designed, produce a surprise discovery, or lead to revolutionary technology, it was self-defeating to try and pick winners. The best one could do was set the conditions for talented scientific minds to indulge their intuition and follow where the method took them. 23 The loose structure of many federal sponsors with very different interests in science as their starting point approximated a random search algorithm that would, it was hoped, outperform Soviet program management for cracking Nature's hidden codes.
In any case, when the need of the republic was great and the science was sufficiently mature, Individual science specialists within the government departments control billions of dollars, slices comparable to the entire NSF budget. 26 Although not even this much money protects agencies from occasional funding crises, the capacity to maintain a science establishment that is both decentralized and well-funded across the board speaks to the deep pockets and the unparalleled borrowing power of the U.S.
Government.
The key vulnerability in this sprawling enterprise is the sheer number of competing priorities that make it hard for the government to keep its collective eye on the prize, in this case research leadership in areas that are not immediately exploitable for economic or military gain. As successful as the United
States has been, performing basic science and applied research to be the pacesetter for other countries during the Information Technology Revolution of the late-twentieth century, the U.S. tendency to convert science into public works projects may delay its rendezvous with the next world shattering technological breakthrough. Perhaps more urgently, a science establishment so thoroughly penetrated by the daily needs of U.S. government operations may not be imaginative or neutral enough to win worldwide respect for U.S. institutions and culture. Such a soft power failure could hollow out American hegemony well before U.S. technological superiority collapses.
Science in the Crucible of a Democratic Power: The Office of Naval Research
In order to see weaknesses in the U.S. scientific position, we have to look beyond the budget figures, impressive by global standards, and examine the relationship between science, state, and society. In the civil-military relations literature, the bare bones logic for analyzing use of the professions follows a class of mathematical models that describe the principal-agent problem. A principal is at the center of a price transaction with the agent, who provides a useful service. In the case where the agent brings specialized skills, the policy question turns on the principal's chief limitation in this interaction: he cannot easily verify that the agent always behaves in a way to maximize his, that is, the principal's, utility. 28 A common way to ensure that net utilities for a policy manager and an implementer remain aligned is to make the laborer's compensation contingent on compliance with regulatory controls.
Unfortunately, regulation, whether for skilled labor, military officers, or government sponsored scientists, imposes costs of its own. A non-expert administrator must extract enough information to at least improve the chances for an accurate evaluation of the agent's choices. This reporting and monitoring, consumes some of the principal's energy, and it affects the agent's behavior. A well-intentioned agent may hold back, or veer from his best judgment, to account for the principal's apparatus and perform to the regulation rather than the principal's enlightened interest. 29 Once regulation enters the principal-agent relationship, observers quickly appreciate the value of smart regulation: sparing, flexible rules that cost less to implement because they bank on the professionalism, not just the skill set, of agents. In exchange for autonomy, agents accept a code of honor, an ethical system that girds them against temptation to pursue their own preferences over those of the principal.
Just how much credence is lent to the professional's code depends in democratic settings on a kind of wild card: the condition of three-way interaction between principal and agent on one side and each of their relations with the public. When professionals, for example, military officers, banking officers, or natural scientists, enjoy high public confidence, that esteem shifts the bargain between principal, in this case representatives of the state, and the expert agent. Societal trust reduces costly monitoring and raises autonomy for the profession. If trust is well-placed, the lighter yoke upon the professionals' shoulders makes for a more resourceful, more competitive state in the global system.
The notion that principal-agent bargaining applies to science, not just the profession of arms or government bureaucrats, is supported by recent headlines on the American Reinvestment and Recovery
Act. 30 The National Science Foundation, the one federal science agency unencumbered by a parent department or conventional executive tasks, still netted three billion dollars from the act in FY2009, an astounding 50% increase over its normal budget. Yet, how the NSF allocated the additional funds depended on more than the needs of pure science.
The money, as part of a controversial stimulus package approved mainly by Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress, had to be spent quickly. So quickly, in fact, the NSF director would not have time to attract fresh proposals. Rejected proposals still on the rolls from FY2008 were the only ones available to receive the three billion dollars. Moreover, NSF scientific grants from the stimulus money would understandably feature extra reporting requirements, including descriptions of jobs created specifically by the new research activity. Even at the NSF and even when the announced goal of the appropriation was to stimulate scientific discovery that might someday invigorate markets, most likely after a long period of diffusion and reconsideration by still unknown applied researchers and engineers, democratic accountability hovered over the negotiations, constraining scientific autonomy and shaping conclusions about where the three billion dollars could best advance basic research.
ONR as a Prominent Case Study
In lieu of a sprawling history for each agency within the U.S. scientific establishment, the Office On the other hand, if the value of studying the science-state-society trinity is in learning how a democratic science establishment can minimize friction and accommodate inevitable contradictions in order to lead science at the global level, first, the outsize forces at play with ONR will be easier to resolve in a case study. Second, if problems within the science trinity can be ameliorated at ONR, this should lay the groundwork for solutions at other military as well as civilian science agencies.
The connection between ONR's scientific work and the Kaysen mechanisms for translating science prowess to national capability could not be clearer. ONR's stated mission is to promote the kind of scientific discovery and technological development that will help the U.S. Navy maintain its superiority over competitors. Naval superiority has attracted attention from geopolitical thinkers across the centuries from Thucydides to Alfred T. Mahan as one of the most important attributes supporting a state's claim to hegemony. Even after the rise of aviation, nuclear weapons, and information technology, naval power remains a crucial instrument for influencing the international order. 31 At the same time, ONR features a satellite organization, ONR-Global (ONRG), which in principle addresses the spillover benefits, that is, the soft power aspects, of scientific greatness that offer a necessary complement to hard power in this multi-polar era. ONRG's five research centers reconnoiter the entire globe. Staff scientists at each office review their designated region for projects, including basic research at the Defense Department's 6.1 level of science and technology, that might one day revolutionize naval operations.
On paper, ONRG has a role not terribly different from that of the great European patrons during the Age of Enlightenment. The global office is to connect scientific genius, perhaps in the person of a young lab director or faculty member toiling in relative obscurity at a foreign institution, to the vast infrastructure of U.S. Science. In exchange for brilliant ideas in natural philosophy, ONRG offers a chance to test vision against reality, to succeed in revising human understanding.
As with aristocratic patronage in the past, ONRG's activity stands to benefit mankind, which only enhances the reputation redounding back to the Office of Naval Research and the United States. If we are going to see the spillover effects of science at work-greater trust between science and society, greater appreciation abroad for the scientific leader even when this culture also belongs to the hegemon, and greater willingness to cooperate with U.S. science in transnational communities-we should find them close to ONR and ONRG.
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ONR and the Erosion of Scientific Leadership
While the overall trend in current dollar amounts devoted to scientific research is upward, the statistic masks periods of stasis or slight decline of government support in constant dollars. 33 The strength of the numbers also relies on the accountant's definition of basic versus applied research. The nature of these categories can vary over time. As Harvard physicist and science policy advisor Harvey
Brooks pointed out during the surge in federal funding for basic research that coincided with President
Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, context matters. The much larger increases in applied projects and technological development for missile defense would condition-and ultimately limit-the benefits of SDI as science policy. 34 In principle, it would be possible to channel sponsorship of basic research into the National Science Foundation. Having more independence from functional imperatives that justify the departments of Commerce or Defense, NSF could pursue scientific discovery unburdened by the near-term needs of market consumers or military commanders.
The problem with this strategy is that it would over-centralize the nation's science portfolio.
With some success, the U.S. grand strategy for science has been to spread the financing and conduct of research across several mission agencies in the public and private sectors, to encourage a fertile mix of competition and cooperation. The ramshackle mansion discussed earlier seems to handle the uncertainty of science investment better than an authoritative Royal Academy sitting atop a unitary government bureaucracy.
Furthermore, some new ideas for science cross back from the applied or operational realms. The intense interest of Commerce or Defense in transitioning new knowledge of Nature to practical application broadens the establishment perspective on scientific problems. The need for such broadening is evidenced by persistent criticism of the standard peer review process for allocating national science funds and the rising age of first-time recipients for NSF grants. 35 Mission-oriented agencies like ONR have an important role in specifically basic research as complements to a robust National Science
Foundation.
Under the intense pressure for mission accomplishment and democratic accountability, can ONR strike an appropriate balance between technological leadership for its operators and scientific leadership for the nation? The question is not completely amenable to social scientific standards of inquiry.
Ultimately, the answer comes down to a political judgment. If the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Naval Operations esteem the Chief of Naval Research, if Congressional committees determine that the service's science and technology budget is about right, then in some sense it must be the case that ONR has found a balance to satisfy diverse stakeholders.
At the same time, social science research on bureaucracies can be used to evaluate the logic of the situation, the incentive structure for the Navy, the Executive Branch, and Congress to resource scientific leadership over the long haul. Reviewing the evidence from congressional testimony, from consulting contracts, and from sample 6.1 projects at ONR and ONR-Global, the accountability challenge begins to take shape. Basic research is still funded at government shops like ONR but under constraints that make it hard to produce revolutionary discoveries of the kind that first bestowed scientific leadership on the United States after World War II.
What is more, the constraints are a special case of a deeper principal-agent dilemma faced by democracies. Elected representatives must think twice before delegating power over social choice to unelected experts. Where expertise is required, politicians will want to keep close tabs on their agents.
This should be especially true in circumstances of rapid change such as a revolution in military affairs or the creation of a new field for scientific research. Overly cautious restrictions on autonomy impose inefficiencies. They slow national progress, opening opportunities for other states to catch the leader in a key economic or military sector and prompt another power cycle in international affairs.
In the case of ONR, its basic research portfolio struggles to hold the attention of Congress.
Typically, 6.1 research is discussed in the context of a subcommittee within the Armed Services Committee in the House or Senate. 36 The lingua franca in such settings emphasizes technology and capabilities that exploit previous scientific discoveries. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, helicopter survivability equipment, and jammers to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq are terms that committee members can easily appropriate for budget battles on the floor or for convincing the public that taxpayer science and technology dollars are being well spent. 37 From the standpoint of protecting national scientific leadership-the capacity to stimulate revolutionary discoveries about the workings of Nature-the current system for budget justification has several problems. Research and Development managers can trace today's astonishing technologies back to fundamental knowledge about Nature, but at the time of public investment to solve a scientific problem, no one can say where the answer will lead before a new theory of Nature has emerged. Lasers are still touted as a revolutionary technological development stemming from Navy sponsored basic research. Yet, as Charles Townes recounted in his commemorative speech at the fortieth anniversary of ONR, the Navy had something very different in mind than the targeting, cutting, and telecommunications applications it eventually received when it funded Townes' research on microwaves. 38 The path between stimulated emissions of gas atoms and future naval capabilities has been long and serendipitous. Many other scientists and organizations, including the Air Force, contributed, making it farcical to speak of a precise rate of return on the Navy's down payment in 6.1 research. Yes, the initial bet on Townes was important, but so were many other decisions taken before and after by entities beyond ONR's control. Exchanges between ONR and inquiring Congressional committees in 2005 were typical. They reflected broad, enduring pressure in a system with democratic accountability to envelop 6.1 activity as part of an integrated product development scheme. Such a scheme illustrates for the waiting public, Congress, and combatant commands how scientific research saves lives and contributes to mission accomplishment in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. 47 The re-contextualizing of 6.1 for wartime budgeting is not innocuous, however. Defining 6.1 in terms of long-term capability privileges product development over a holistic view of basic research as the -e lixir of civilization,‖ Man grappling with Nature rather than the political ploys of other men. 48 Single-minded pursuit of superior technology, euphemistically billed as goal-oriented research at the behest of operators distracts from superior phenomenology. It blocks young researchers from challenging conventional wisdom, going back to the drawing board and redefining the problem, asking the right questions to explore Nature's vault.
As the product development mentality takes hold of basic research budgets in mission agencies across the government, within DOD and beyond, it becomes more difficult for the nation to maintain its pioneering spirit and the list of accomplishments opening new vistas in science. There appears at the international level an open window for other states, states smaller in terms of their research capital but bolder in their philosophy, to walk through and capture the title of scientific leadership-even from a liberal-democratic incumbent.
Role of ONRG
The Office of Naval Research-Global enjoys advantages for resisting democratic pressures and striking the right balance between mission-oriented technology development and pioneering basic research. ONRG's staff in London has been working this area as long as ONR, in some sense longer since British and American naval officials began dismantling barriers to science and technology collaboration before U.S. entry into World War II. 49 In the gap between the end of the war and the build-up of the National Science Foundation during the 1950s, ONR actually led government sponsorship of scientific research. 50 
Interestingly, the Air Force has approximated this ideal with the European Office for Aerospace Research and Development (EAORD), which represents the overseas headquarters for the Air Force
Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), the service's single sponsor for projects in 6.1. As previously mentioned though, AFOSR and EAORD's identification with 6.1 has not always protected them from budgetary depredations by other Air Force agencies. ONRG, possibly with this example in mind, has followed the modern ONR in rejecting a dedicated scientific branch. ONRG's scientific associates in London are tasked to scout both basic and applied research within their region of responsibility.
Small size-about 1% of the $2 billion Navy S&T budget-transoceanic distances, and blending with applied research insulate ONRG from pressures for democratic accountability and the prying eyes of Congressional subcommittees. However, ONRG still does not enjoy the autonomy its parent organization explored in the late-1940s. Oversight in the public interest for the case of ONRG falls to the Chief of Naval Research and a Naval Corporate Board that includes deputies of the Navy Secretary and the Chief of Naval Operations; these senior officials do surface in Congressional hearings and must hitch their fates to the good opinion of the Fleet, the operational masters of the Navy.
The Fleet, being directly responsible for the sailors, submariners, aviators, and marines deployed across the globe, is hardly a less demanding taskmaster than Congress. Even in London or Tokyo, integration of science and technology programs pushes 6.1 to be more like 6.2 rather than the other way around. What is more, the Fleet pays close attention to military relations with other countries. There is always a chance for basic research contracting to find itself drafted in the service of -m ilitary diplomacy.‖ While diplomatic relationships are vital for the Navy and the nation, they come at a cost if a scientific specialist abandons his area of expertise to create geopolitically astute regional profiles for general science and technology. Pursuing politically rewarding projects in South Africa, for example, requires a different skill set from detecting state-of-the-art particle physics research in the Western
Hemisphere. The human networks and the appropriate conceptual vocabulary do not overlap sufficiently, so an ONRG university scientist will inevitably drop the pure science trail in order to smooth the way for diplomacy, or country-by-country engagement. Captain Conrad's alternative in 1946 would have let particle physics do the initial talking so that countries of interest would end lined up to engage U.S.
science.
Benefits of diplomacy accrue in the short term. 
Responding to U.S. Science: The Case of Brazil
Based on how U.S. constitutional democracy is structured, we should observe a recurring tension between society's desire to benefit from professional expertise and its demand for accountability. In the Along all lines of action-U.S. administration, cultural outreach, and transnational organization-the United States could be performing better, in terms of its science and more so its diplomacy. One hindrance is its constitutionally ingrained habit of breaking up basic research and tying the fragments to wide-ranging mission agencies, which are desperate to deliver not the next great natural discoveries but today's technological applications.
Brazilian Disposition
As the United States reaches out to engage the world and make the case that it should have a leading voice, a benign hegemony rather than an empire, to organize cooperation in the face of global challenges, each target of influence, or potential partner, comprises a unique case. Some principles of diplomacy and power politics apply across regions, but at the same time, successful American leadership will depend on the hegemon's capacity to tailor its approach, to make each partner feel special by granting it unique attention.
Brazil has its own history of national science, with a particular set of advantages and challenges Brazilian industry and higher education are applying to the government rather than anteing in from other sources of revenue.
Moving beyond basic research to the broader category of science and technology, Brazil's activities are more diverse. Companies such as Petrobras, the eighth largest oil company in the world by stock evaluation, and Embraer, the fourth largest maker of commercial aircraft, have earned a reputation for beating international competition in high technology niches. 63 Yet, companies such as these are the exceptions. Brazil's export ranking in the world is lower than that for its GDP, and the greater share of goods sold in the global market are commodities-coffee and soy-or manufactures, which do not require a rich scientific foundation for extraction or state-of-theart technology. Moreover, it is far from clear that Petrobras or Embraer could have achieved their world class status without extraordinary state intervention. The Brazilian Government owns a controlling share of the oil giant, and Embraer was privatized only in 1994. 64 
U.S. Institutions: Still Suboptimal
Given the obstacles Brazil presents for U.S. engagement, the United States has not responded in Defense science agencies have an interest that ranges across the physical and life sciences, broad like the NSF. Collectively the annual Science and Technology (S&T) investment for these agencies is on the order of $10 billion, and in principle, they can sponsor the best science wherever it is found. 71 Here, where we find perhaps the greatest potential to enlist America's scientific leadership in the cause of an enlightened, sustainable hegemony, the scientific mindset falters. Basic science is not organized or administered by the leading state in an optimal way. This failure raises the possibility for revolutionary change in the international enterprise of natural discovery, and eventually in the power distribution among nations.
The trajectory of the U.S. Office of Naval Research (ONR) away from pure science and the trouble ONR has had in the past few years engaging the Brazilian science establishment illustrate a
Tocquevillian tension between democratic accountability and scientific greatness on behalf of the State.
In the course of surveying nineteenth century America, the French diplomat incisively showed how love of equality-even in a society inspired by freedom extolled in the Declaration of Independence-could be enemy to the good. Moreover, accountability through elections or public opinion could act as a scythe, cutting down the best and brightest in the name of equality among men. 
Consequences for Cultural Attraction and Epistemic Influence
Understandable pressures related to democratic accountability for U.S. Executive Branch agencies have placed a tight-fitting collar on sponsored research. It would be unfair to call it a stranglehold: the Federal Government enables more than it distorts pure research, and the American science establishment remains respected throughout the world. Yet, the interference does perturb how the best of American science engages the rest of the world. Since the technology for sophisticated experiments is diffusing over time and since foreign scientists find it increasingly feasible to travel and collaborate internationally, in the long run, U.S. missteps with regard to science as a cosmopolitan enterprise could jeopardize the scientific lead. 74 In the shorter term, U.S. neglect or ham-fisted outreach to scientists abroad diminish positive spill-over from American scientific achievement to influence in international affairs.
Returning to the bilateral relationship between the United States and Brazil, several items on the agenda inspire only modest levels of confidence and trust, even though the bargaining involves high quotients of scientific and technical information. On issue after issue-trade, alternative fuels, oil, climate change, U.S. military operations in Latin America, or the global financial crisis-Brazil demurs on the notion that American power heralds a civilizing hegemony that lifts up the rest of the world.
Instead, Brazil maintains important preferences at odds with U.S. priorities. In this relationship, soft power-combining the gentle currents of legitimacy and cultural attraction-has a lot of work to do.
At the Summit of the Americas in 2005 and again at the Doha Round of international trade talks in 2008, Brazil was cordial but adamant that whatever world economic growth lower barriers to investment and greater market access in developing countries might achieve, it would not be purchased by the concessions of low-cost agricultural producers in the Global South. 75 Brazil's producers of sugarbased ethanol already face anti-competitive import tariffs in order to prop up corn-based suppliers in the United States. 76 Moreover the United States has not taken the bold steps required to control its appetite for oil such as manufacturing flex engines that could run on ethanol or gasoline, and building alternative energy power plants. Brazil Given the negative alternatives of no credible epistemic communities or communities dominated by a foreign scientific establishment, there is a case for the U.S. Government to allow its funded scientists a free hand, so they can respond to incentives beyond government operations when designing basic research. Professional autonomy is likely to be the best way to ensure American education, professional training, and cultural values claim several seats at the table as transnational epistemic communities form.
American policy makers, if they wish to court legitimacy and collect the highest diplomatic return on U.S.
provision of public goods, will in turn take note when these epistemic communities announce their findings.
Conclusion: Science and Democracy
As this article is being written, the United States is in a soul-searching mood. A new president and Congress lead a nation-wide review of American foreign policy, in particular questioning U.S.
commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, budget deficits are growing, iconic American businesses are struggling, and unemployment for the first time in a quarter century approaches double digits.
On the one hand, leaders of both political parties in the United States recognize the traditional links between scientific progress and international leadership. The President has found broad support in an era of tight budgets for research that can prompt technological development for ground units of the Army or Marines scrambling to solve counterinsurgency problems or for U.S. carmakers urgently redesigning their products in a volatile global market. With respect to its military crisis and its economic crisis, the most powerful nation-state reserves space in its accounts for science to help innovate its way out.
Less appreciated is how scientific progress facilitates diplomatic strategy in the long run, how it contributes to Joseph Nye's soft power, which translates to staying power in the international arena. One possible escape from the geopolitical forces depicted in Thucydides' history for all time is for the current hegemon to maintain its lead in science, conceived as a national program and as an enterprise belonging to all mankind.
Beyond the new technologies for projecting military or economic power, the scientific ethos conditions the hegemon's approach to social-political problems. It effects how the leader organizes itself and other states to address well-springs of discontent-material inequity, religious or ethnic oppression, and environmental degradation. The scientific mantle attracts others' admiration, which softens or at least complicates other societies' resentment of power disparity. Finally, for certain global problems-nuclear proliferation, climate change, and financial crisis-the scientific lead ensures robust representation in transnational epistemic communities that can shepherd intergovernmental negotiations onto a conservative, or secular, path in terms of preserving international order.
In today's order, U.S. hegemony is yet in doubt even though military and economic indicators confirm its status as the world's lone superpower. America possesses the material wherewithal to maintain its lead in the sciences, but it also desires to bear the standard for freedom and democracy.
Unfortunately, patronage of basic science does not automatically flourish with liberal democracy.
The free market and the mass public impose demands on science that tend to move research out of the basic and into applied realms. Absent the lead in basic discovery, no country can hope to pioneer humanity's quest to know Nature. There is a real danger U.S. state and society could permanently confuse sponsorship of technology with patronage of science, thereby delivering a self-inflicted blow to U.S. leadership among nations.
Perhaps all these observations reflect Thucydides' cycle-the rise and fall of great powers-and nothing can be done. Yet, such pessimism ignores the successful record of the United States in negotiating comparable dilemmas, notably the contradiction between capitalism, an economic system that concentrates wealth, and democracy, a political system that diffuses the vote.
Fareed Zakaria, editor at Newsweek magazine and author of rare books that travel across highbrow international relations theory and popular culture, offered some room for maneuver when he characterized the current crisis in capitalism as a crisis in professions for American democracy. 84 Adam
Smith's laissez-faire market could not survive without Adam Smith's theory of moral sentiments.
Today's sophisticated global economy will not create wealth without professions that are both technically competent and socially conscious.
A growing literature in American politics applies principal-agent dynamics to explain how democracies respond to policy challenges demanding technical expertise. 85 Typically, the agents are professionals responsible for conveying expert knowledge to politician principals representing the public interest. Whether the professionals are military officers, intelligence agents, or diplomats, American democracy faces a dilemma of control.
Too much monitoring or intervention politicizes the agents, binds them from speaking truth to power and guts their value as expert professionals. Too little direct involvement means the experts can use their information advantage to manipulate the principal: technocracy replaces government by the people.
The social science literature recognizes that the best practical solution is somewhere in between, and anticipating Zakaria, that the dilemma is less acute if the professionals develop Adam Smith's moral sentiments, that is, if the expert advisers see themselves as officers with a stake in the larger system. The more seriously professionals take this moral code to serve the principal and not game the system by exploiting asymmetric knowledge for their individual benefit, the more autonomy they can be granted, and the more the republic can gain from expertise in military affairs, intelligence analysis, or economic strategy.
Particularly after the U.S. government's dramatic expansion of patronage for science through the Office of Naval Research in 1946, science is home to one of those professions vital for maintaining national power and position in the international system. Furthermore, a familiar principal-agent dilemma confounds democratic attempts to strike the balance between technocratic virtuosity and public accountability. 86 At present, the difficulties mission-oriented bureaucracies like ONR have in detecting
and nurturing Nobel quality work in the basic sciences suggest that democratic constraints are set too tight.
To regain the reputation abroad for outstanding American Science, government sponsors will have to grant scientists more autonomy at home, especially in the field of basic research.
Program directors and scientist beneficiaries at university will garner more freedom from politicians and policymakers if they can embrace a professional ethos both patriotic and moral. If these professionals internalize social benefits to science, to mankind, and to America's international influence from fulfilling the public trust, American democracy can scale back its regulations. It can also subdue debilitating demands for timely material results without fretting over the loyalty of experts serving on the remote frontiers of science. experts will unavoidably have greater temptation to defraud the public or substitute their preferences for those of political masters in the mission agencies. Nevertheless, more progress reports, more assessment rubrics, and tighter integration with technology demands increase accountability only at the cost of enervating the national effort to expand the frontiers of knowledge. Zakaria had it correct: in the long run no system, certainly no democracy, can retain the lead internationally in scientific, economic, or political development if its professionals will not hew to duty, especially when no one is looking.
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